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Introduction
The European sovereign debt crisis has forced the French national government to find
new funding sources; increasing the top marginal tax rate is a means of doing so.
Consequently, and given the average salary of soccer players, taxation is an important
contingent factor for teams in an international competitive environment. To such an
extent that Arsène Wenger, manager of Arsenal FC, predicted that “with the new tax-
ation system ... the domination of the Premier League will go, that is for sure” (The
Sunday Times, April 25, 2009) when the British government decided to increase the
top marginal tax rate from 40% to 50%.1
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of the French 75% income tax rate on the attractive-
ness of the French soccer league. The concerns are less about its financial implications
for clubs than about the possible decrease in its attractiveness. A classical model of
professional team sport leagues is employed to measure the Nash equilibrium com-
petitive balance and the stock of talent to assess the effect of the new taxation. We then
propose two hypotheses corresponding to specific situations in the French soccer
league: “social and fiscal disparities between clubs” and “sugar daddy” behavior. The
new model predicts a polarization of the league and an exodus of talent, which could
be mitigated by revenue sharing.
Keywords: sport economics, professional team sports, competitive balance, taxation
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Why was the powerful Premier League so afraid of this marginal change? One rea-
son is the “Bosman ruling” and the ensuing liberalization of the player market. The
decision by the European Court of Justice to ban restrictions on foreign EU players has
intensified the inter-league competition for players (Gouguet, 2004), especially for the
superstars (Gouguet & Primault, 2003). In a market where the players have perfect
mobility, taxation is a key criterion in their choice of location (Kleven, Landais, & Saez,
2013). Fluctuation in the top marginal tax rate then has a direct impact on the com-
petitiveness of clubs and leagues.
The French 75% tax rate law, enforced since 2014, acts as a significant fluctuation.
The new tax system implies that all incomes of over €1 million per year will be taxed
at 75%, and then affects the French championship attractiveness, called Ligue 1 (L1),
by changing the allocation of resources intra- and inter-leagues. 
This paper is organized as follows. The following section presents the 75% tax rate
mechanisms and its direct impact on L1 clubs. A model of sports leagues is used in the
next section with revenue function depending on the relative and the aggregate quali-
ty of the teams. It allows measuring the Nash equilibrium competitive balance and the
stock of talent to assess the effect of the new taxation on the league attractiveness.
Next, we adapt the model to specific situations. First, we analyze a case of social and
fiscal imbalance in a national championship. This must reflect the situation of the AS
Monaco in L1. Second, we formulate a hypothesis regarding the behavior of club own-
ers: what happens when a club maximizes wins under exogenous soft budget con-
straint? Finally, we discuss the impact of revenue sharing on competitive balance in
relation to the new taxation. 
Mechanisms and Direct Impact of the 75% Tax Rate
It is important to first provide an overview of the existing research on tax system
changes and regulation of professional leagues before discussing the mechanism of the
French tax on high wages and its impact on L1.
Tax System and Professional Sports Leagues
On both sides of the Atlantic, 1995 was a key year in the regulation of professional
sports leagues. On one side, the National Hockey League decided to help reduce the
economic gap (exchange rate, taxation and social security system, and public assis-
tance) between the Canadian and American franchises by creating two support funds
to reduce the differences and keep franchises in Canada (Helleu & Durand, 2006). On
the other side, the European Union (EU) implemented the Bosman ruling, which
increased competition between clubs and leagues to attract the best players, with no
restrictions on foreign EU members. Since 2003, players from countries who signed
the Cotonou Treaty (with 79 African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries) and the Malaja
ruling (involving countries associated with the EU) also have no restriction to play in
Europe. Economists have paid great attention to the European Court of Justice’s deci-
sion, particularly with regard to transfer fees (Tervio, 2006; Frick, 2007). Kleven et al.’s
(2013) research study gives interesting insight into the topic of this paper. Indeed, the
originality of their work lies in their focusing on the effects of income tax rates on the
international migration of workers. For that purpose, they analyzed the soccer player
market in Europe in two steps. First, they performed an analysis of special tax schemes
French 75% Tax Rate
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offering preferential tax rates in specific countries (Spain, Denmark, Belgium, and
Greece). Second, they presented a theoretical model showing the relation between tax-
ation and migration for the 15 main European championships. 
Since the European soccer player market was liberalized in 1995, there has been a
positive and large correlation between tax rates and players’ location decisions. Kleven
and colleagues note that this effect is reinforced in the case of the most talented work-
ers. This result supports the findings of Gouguet and Primault (2003) concerning the
Bosman ruling. Based upon these results, we expect that the French 75% tax rate,
which is unique in Europe, will lead to an exodus of the best players from L1 to rival
leagues abroad. This is an important issue for L1 attractiveness as there is a growth of
televised matches featuring foreign leagues (Solberg & Mehus, 2014), offering substi-
tutes for fans with more aggregate talent.  
The French 75% Tax Rate: Mechanisms
During the last presidential election campaign, François Hollande pledged to levy a
75% income tax rate, for a period of two years, on all annual income above €1 million.
The proposal was motivated by the necessity to balance the public accounts and by a
desire for social justice. However, the Constitutional council of the French Republic
struck down this top income tax rate, ruling that it would be applied to individuals
rather than households. Consequently, the French government amended the bill to
shift the burden from individuals to employers. In other words, this measure increas-
es the employers’ contributions for salaries over € 1 million per year and thus the total
cost of talent for clubs.
The Constitutional council’s decision has a threefold impact on French soccer. First,
this measure has no direct consequence on players’ salary. Second, the tax implies that
French soccer clubs will have to pay a higher price in order to maintain the salary level
of their players. Unlike Kleven et al. (2013), the adjustment variable in the labor mar-
ket is no longer the supply (players basing their location decisions according to net
earnings), but the player hiring by team owners who must take into account the new
budgetary constraints. Third, the AS Monaco (ASM) now benefits from the fiscal
arrangements between France and Monaco whereby companies located in the
Principality of Monaco are exempt from French taxation laws, whereas French taxpay-
ers are not. Had the Constitutional council not rejected the proposed tax rate, the
French players of the ASM paid over €1 million per year would have been subject to
the 75% tax rate. However, in order to reduce the financial pressure on French firms,
the government decided that the total tax payout would be capped at 5% of a corpo-
ration’s annual turnover. Despite this concession, the clubs’ union has complained that
the government has decided to tax businesses that have been in difficulty over the last
seasons.2 The tax system alone is not responsible for the financial difficulties of French
clubs, since clubs and the league have long suffered from a weak governance structure
(Andreff, 2007).
The French 75% Tax Rate in L1
There were 114 players from 14 L1 clubs that earned salaries of more than €1 million
per year in 2013. Even though the bonuses are variable, the aggregate tax cost is esti-
mated by the clubs themselves at €44 million per year. 3 This estimation is questioned
by the government. Nevertheless, as there is no other available data, we shall use this
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estimate in our analysis of the effects of the French 75% tax rate, which it is not a prob-
lem as we focus on theoretical analysis.
According to club owners, this new tax could potentially threaten the viability of the
clubs. Table 1 sums up the direct impact of the 75% tax rate for each club. From Table
1, it is possible to categorize the clubs according to the effects of the tax (Table 2). Five
categories emerge (Terrien, Durand, Maltese, & Veran, 2014).
Clubs that are not impacted will be the main beneficiaries of the increase of the top
marginal tax rate to 75%. As seen in Table 1, five clubs are not concerned by this tax
rate as they do not pay any of their players’ annual salaries of € 1 million or over.
Furthermore, Monaco benefits from its registered office being located in the
Principality. Moreover, four clubs benefit from a significant tax cost reduction thanks
to the implementation of a measure capping the tax at 5% of the clubs’ turnover even
though those clubs are the most affected by the tax, along with Bordeaux and Rennes.
The effect is uncertain for the remaining clubs. The new taxation appears to be an
additional cost for clubs. Nevertheless, it could create new sporting opportunities for
them thanks to the financial difficulties it will cause to rival clubs. 
Table 1. Effect of the French 75% Tax Rate on Soccer Clubs in L1 (2013–2014)
Clubs Turnover Number Tax Relative Tax Relative Tax
2012– of players without impact with cap impact of reduction
2013 cap of tax (in K€) tax with with cap
(in K€) (in K€) without cap (in K€)
cap (in K€) 
Paris 392,892 21 43,565 11,09 % 1,9645 5 % 23,920  
Marseille 104,535 17 13,034 12,47 % 5,227 5 % 7,807
Lyon 99,083 14 11,545 11,65 % 4,954 5 % 6,591
Bordeaux 67,766 14 4,151 6,13 % 3,388 5 % 763
Lille 96,255 13 7,696 8,00 % 4,813 5 % 2,883
Saint-Etienne 49,951 9 896 1,79 % 896 1,79 % 0
Rennes 42,036 8 3,316 7,89 % 2,102 5 % 1,214
Toulouse 35,415 7 1,196 3,38 % 1,196 3,38 % 0
Montpellier 74,367 3 356 0,48 % 356 0,48 % 0
Valenciennes 30,257 3 206 0,68 % 206 0,68 % 0
Nice 33,815 2 1,076 3,18 % 1,076 3,18 % 0
Ajaccio 20,381 1 99 0,49 % 99 0,49 % 0
Bastia 24,708 1 178 0,72 % 178 0,72 % 0
Guingamp 22,000 1 9 0,04 % 9 0,04 % 0
Evian 32,300 0 0 0 % 0 0 % 0
Lorient 32,860 0 0 0 % 0 0 % 0
Monaco 130,000 0 0 0 % 0 0 % 0
Nantes 32,000 0 0 0 % 0 0 % 0
Reims 28,581 0 0 0 % 0 0 % 0
Sochaux 30,648 0 0 0 % 0 0 % 0
Sum 1,379,850 114 87,323 44,145 43,178
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The results shown in Table 1 are calculated for a given payroll. However, clubs have
room to maneuver and will implement a strategic response to cope with this new con-
straint. To estimate the dynamic equilibrium of L1, we use the non-cooperative game
theory in our competitive balance model.
Competitive Balance and the 75% Tax Rate
First, a short overview of the competitive balance concept is provided. We then speci-
fy our general model. We finally discuss the effect of the 75% tax rate and the conse-
quences of capping the tax at 5% of the company’s revenue.
Competitive Balance: What is it About?
There is a common understanding that a sporting competition is more successful
when the degree of competitive balance among teams is high. Through the Louis-
Schmelling paradox, Neale (1964) shows beyond doubt that competitive balance is
essential to professional sports. Thus, much effort is expended to measure it, with a
high heterogeneity in the measuring instruments used (Mourão & Cima, 2015). There
are two approaches for understanding uncertainty of outcome: competitive intensity,
which is related to sporting stakes, and competitive balance (Scelles, Durand, Bonnal,
Goyeau, & Andreff, 2013; Terrien, Scelles, & Durand, 2015). Focusing on the latter,
three time scales can be considered: a game, a season, or several seasons (Szymanski &
Kuypers, 1999). Here, we replicate the model of a league with two clubs inspired by
that of El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971). El-Hodiri and Quirk’s model provides the first
formalization of competitive balance. It is useful for testing the “invariance principle”
introduced by Rottenberg (1956) following a Walrasian approach to general equilibri-
um. This principle states that the elimination of the reserve clause in professional base-
ball will not cause competitive imbalance in Major League Baseball (MLB). Other
policy tools have been tested (e.g., gate revenue sharing, the draft system) and no sig-
nificant effect on outcome uncertainty has been found (Scully, 1995; Vrooman, 1995).
Salary restrictions should theoretically improve competitive balance, even if a non-
optimal situation is produced (Késenne, 2000, 2007).
Table 2. Typology of French Soccer Clubs Related to 75% Tax Rate Effect
Clubs deeply impacted by the tax Clubs impacted by the tax
and the implementation of the cap (less than 5% of turnover)
Significant tax Marginal tax Significant Marginal 
reduction reduction impact impact
(more than   (less than (more than 1%   (less than 1% 
2 M€) 2 M€) of turnover) of turnover)*
Paris Bordeaux Toulouse Montpellier  
Marseille Rennes Saint-Etienne Guingamp  
Lyon  Valenciennes Ajaccio
Lille Nice Bastia
* Six clubs not impacted by the tax: Evian, Lorient, Monaco, Nantes, Reims, and
Sochaux
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However, the “invariance principle” is situated within the specific context of North
American major leagues, which differs from that of European leagues. The former are
closed leagues with a limited number of franchises whose objective is to maximize
profit. European soccer leagues are open; the promotion and relegation system struc-
tures the championships, which impacts owners’ behavior. The goal of club owners
seems to be more oriented toward win maximization within budget constraints
(Davenport, 1969; Sloane, 1971). Indeed, 63% of European soccer clubs in 2011
reported losses (UEFA, 2011), which provides evidence that the majority of the own-
ers are not oriented toward profit. Unlike the North American cooperative franchises,
European soccer teams are rivals; the talent supply is no longer exogenously deter-
mined but is variable (Andreff, 2009). This leads to a non-cooperative Nash equilibri-
um model (Szymanski & Késenne 2004).4
The General Model
Let us consider a league with only two clubs (i = 1, 2) with different revenue functions.
We assume this function to be dependent upon the local economic potential, which
can be approximated by an exogenous variable: the market size mi. Here, Team 1 ben-
efits from an asymmetric revenue advantage m1 > m2. Revenue is also affected by a
club’s winning percentage wi. According to the fan preference for competitive balance,
reflected by β, the part of the revenue functions depending on relative talent Ri is
strictly concave:5
(1)
It is common in the literature to assume that revenues depend only on relative tal-
ent. However, consumers’ valuation and then teams’ incomes may suffer from the new
taxation if it implies an exodus of talent, even if the competitive balance improves.
Following Madden (2011), we assume that the revenue function Pi(wi,T) depends also
on aggregate talent T with T = Ti + Tj. The revenue function is assumed to be homo-
geneous of degree σ∊[0;1] with σ measuring the constant elasticity of revenue with
respect to changes in the aggregate team quality. Then, the revenue function depend-
ing on relative and absolute talent is: 
(2)
We assume that playing talent is perfectly divisible and available on the profession-
al players’ labor market at a constant marginal cost of c. An exogenous cost pertains to
a flexible talent supply (Szymanski, 2004) and implies that clubs are wage takers. This
hypothesis is generally accepted even though clubs may exercise enough market power
to affect the price levels (Cavagnac & Gouguet, 2008; Madden, 2011).
As the payroll does not differentiate between units of playing talent, the tax burden
cannot be applied only on the basis of individual salaries of over €1 million. We there-
fore assume that the cost will be borne by all individuals on the payroll.6 Let d > 0 be
the marginal tax burden added to the constant marginal cost of talent c. As Table 1
highlights, weak payrolls are not concerned with the new tax system. Therefore, the
parameter d is applied from the threshold L such that                 . Moreover, the tax
French 75% Tax Rate
Volume 11 • Number 3 • 2016 • IJSF 189
burden of team i will increase with its payroll Ti until the cap becomes effective, with
the threshold given by dTi>(1-x)Pi: The existence of fiscal cap at (1-x) % of the
turnover of Club i means that the tax burden is no longer graduated on Ti, but only
depends on Pi. This cap allows reducing the tax cost for Club i. Therefore, after the
application of the tax, Club i keeps x% of its turnover Pi.
The expenditure on playing talent is the only club cost and clubs’ objective is to
maximize wins wi under a strict seasonal budget constraint that does not allow for
losses. The profit functions of teams after the implementation of the new taxation sys-
tem change according to the value taken by ti. Then three profit functions are
described:
(3A)
(3B)
(3C)
A contest success function depends both on the number of talent units Ti and also
on the number of talent units Tj of the competing club. The contest success function
is given by: 
(4)
According to this contest success function, the acquisition of an additional unit of
playing talent has an external effect on the other club. The teams find themselves in a
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Simultaneous win maximization (mutual best
response with πi = 0) for both teams yields the reaction functions. As we use different
profit functions (3A, 3B, 3C), we obtain three reaction functions expressed in terms of
the aggregate quality of teams as                :
(5A)
(5B)
(5C)
Competitive Balance and Exodus of Talent
Let Club 2 have no player paid over €1 million per year (ct2 ≤ L) and Club 1, operat-
ing in the largest market, be subject to the 75% tax plus cap regime [ct1 > L and dt1 >
(1-x)P1]. To assess the effect of introducing a tax and the advisability of its cap on the
league attractiveness, we proposed three equilibria. First, we define competitive bal-
ance before the implementation of the tax (A). Assuming the profit function of teams
1 and 2 are respectively (3C) if x = 1 (or (3B) if d = 0) and (3A) provide the equilibri-
um B by equalizing the related reaction functions (5C) with x = 1 and (5A):
(6A)
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In the initial situation, the league is naturally imbalanced and outcome uncertainty
is not guaranteed. Second, we assess the only tax regime (B): the threshold dt1 ≤ (1-
x)P1 in (3B) is removed. Without the governmental concession to cap the tax, this
equilibrium C would have prevailed in L1. Profit functions of team 1 and 2 are (3B)
and (3A), respectively. By equalizing the reaction functions (5A) and (5B), the only tax
regime equilibrium is:
(6B)
Third, we define competitive balance in the tax plus cap regime (C). This configu-
ration is the theoretical one prevailing in L1 (with x = 0.95). Profit functions of team
1 and 2 are (3C) and (3A), respectively. By equalizing the related reaction functions
(5C and 5A), we obtain the following equilibrium:
(6C)
Those win percentages are not sensitive to the elasticity of revenue with respect to
changes in the aggregate team quality. Assuming that the revenue function only
depends on relative talent is inconsequential on competitive balance, but not for the
stock of talent. It increases when the revenue advantage of team 1 is moderated. From
(5C) and (6C) for the tax plus cap equilibrium prevailing in L1: 
The evolution of the attractiveness degree of the league could be assessed thanks to
those three equilibria. Notice that                   (with 1 ≤ β ≤ 2) and                    when d
= 0. Then, the only tax regime that improves the competitive balance compared to the
initial configuration is:                                               Since the league attractiveness also
depends on aggregate talent, a comparison between the several levels of talent is nec-
essary. By substituting the win percentage (6B) in the aggregate quality function (5A),
the drain grows as d increases since         has the sign of         . Thanks to  
when d = 0,                    for . 
(with 1 ≤ β ≤ 2),                      when x = 1. The introduction of the prevailing 
tax system also improves the competitive balance:                                                    
Slackening the cap (increasing x) qualifies this beneficial effect. To assess the league
attractiveness, TA must be compared to TC. By substituting the win percentage (6C)
in the aggregate quality function (5A), we deduce          has the sign of            . As  when
x = 1, the implementation of the tax leads to an exodus of talent:  
Reducing the tax payable (increasing x) helps limit this migration.
The new tax rate (tax only or tax plus cap regime) helps improve competitive balance
of L1 and has the same effect as a salary cap. This is not surprising if we consider Scully’s
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argument (1995) that a salary cap can act as a tax on superstar salaries. The question
remains if it was wise to implement a tax cap by comparing equilibria B and C:
(7)
Despite the new tax that allows reducing the wins gap between the two teams relat-
ed to the initial equilibrium                , the implementation of the cap limits this
improvement As the winning percentage is inelastic to σ, we conclude that
whatever σ∊[0;1], The
uncertainty of outcome of L1 is damaged by the implementation of the tax cap. This
is the argument used by Frédéric Thiriez, president of the French Professional Soccer
League (LFP), to challenge the advisability of the cap: “I am not saying that the out-
come is worse than the initial system, but it is really unfair. The reality is that the
biggest clubs will benefit from the tax cap. That is to say Paris-SG basically, and to
some extent Marseille, Lyon or Lille.”7 Nevertheless, the tax cap has an interest to limit
the exodus of talent. From (5A), (6B), and (6C), aggregate quality of teams increases
since  As  , the transitive relation  
is observed, whatever σ∊[0;1].
The competition organizer has to solve the dilemma between competitive balance
and aggregate quality of teams, as Figure 1 and Table 3 illustrate. The initial situation
(equilibrium A) prevails whenever d = 0 or x = 1. The competitive balance [given by
(6A)] and the aggregate talent [given by (6A) and (5A)] are invariable. When d > 0 and
x = 1, only tax regime (B) prevails, leading to an improvement of the competitive bal-
ance and an exodus of talent. In Figure 1, lets define points I, II, and III, with d posi-
tive and constant. In I, x = 0, whereas x = c / (c + d) in II, and x = 1 in III. From I
towards II in the diagram, nothing changes in terms of competitive balance and stock
of talent, as the tax burden of Club 1 is still below the cap. In other words, Club 1 still
uses the (3B) profit function (tax only regime). Instead, moving above II towards III
means that Club 1 now benefits from the tax plus cap regime. Equilibrium C now pre-
vails and the aggregate stock of talent is given by (6C) and (5C). As x increases, com-
Figure 1. Tax plus cap regime, tax only regime, and initial equilibria.
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petitive balance is worsened and an influx of talent is observed until x = 1, where T and
w1 return to their initial value given by equilibrium A.
The case of French L1 lies between II and III (x = 0.95); d was determined by the
French government, and the competition organizer has no say on the matter. However,
the tax cap was added to mitigate the contestation of the clubs’ union. Assuming the
total amount of tax revenue collected is deemed sufficient to the French government,
this actual equilibrium is optimal only if the primary aim of the league was to maxi-
mize the aggregate quality of teams. 
Otherwise, as Frédéric Thiriez argued, the system would be suboptimal. This leads
us to believe that this intermediary situation could be optimized.
Extension of the Model and Policy Regulation
In this section, both clubs are now assumed to be subject to the 75% tax rate (cTi ≥ L).
We relax some of the model’s hypotheses in reaction functions to be in line with the
stylized facts of L1. This suggests that we reverse our argument about the cap advisa-
bility. 
Social and Fiscal Distortions in a Professional Sports League
The increase of the top marginal tax rate in France has also highlighted the compara-
tive advantage enjoyed by the ASM. As explained previously, due to the terms of the
Franco-Monegasque tax convention, Monaco levies no income tax on individuals, the
only exception being that French nationals must pay French income tax. As a result,
ASM benefits from social and fiscal distortions, compared with other L1 clubs. Given
the club’s payroll, this advantage is estimated at €70 million per year, divided between
social (€50 million for foreign players) and fiscal (€20 million, related to the 75% tax
rate) distortions.8 We assume club 1 to be located in such an area. Its social advantage
implies a lower constant marginal cost (c - e) with e > 0 leading to a cheaper acquisi-
tion of unit of playing talent for team 1 than for team 2. The fiscal distortion implies
that the new taxation system does not apply to team 1 whatever T1 is. Whatever the
tax regime is (related to stock of talent T1), the profit function for team 1 is: 
, leading to the reaction function 5D:
(5D)
Table 3. Tax Plus Cap Regime, Tax Only Regime, and Initial Equilibria
French 75% Tax Rate
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Club 2 does not benefit from such an advantage. According to T2, the profit func-
tions (2A), (2B), and (2C) are still applied, with the respective function reactions (5A),
(5B), and (5C). 
We now apply the theoretical framework presented in the previous section to this
context to describe three additional equilibria. First, we define the initial situation (D)
when club 2 does not suffer from the new tax rate thanks to the reaction functions
(5D) and (5A): 
(6D)
e = 0 means a lack of social dumping from club 1, leading to                        Notice 
showing that the competitive balance worsens as the social distortions 
grow:                          . We then determine the only tax (equilibrium E) and the tax plus
cap (equilibrium F) equilibria from the equalization of the reaction functions (5B)
and (5D), and (5C) and (5D): 
(6E)
(6F)
for d = 0,                    and             has the sign of             . Thus  
and                      if d ≤ 0. For x = 1,                                     .  and 
has the sign of               therefore                     and                        if                      Then 
the competitive balance and the aggregate quality of teams worsen due to the new tax-
ation.
Nevertheless, the implementation of the cap allows reducing the competitive imbal-
ance and the exodus of talent, which follow the introduction of the 75% tax rate: what-
ever Slackening the cap leads to more 
outcome uncertainty as the introduction of the tax enhanced the competitive advan-
tage of the ASM head office location. Thus, the French Football Federation (FFF)
wanted to introduce a new rule making it a requirement for all L1 clubs to have their
head office in France. ASM came to an “illegal” agreement (according to the State
Council) with the LFP that guarantees the club’s participation in the French champi-
onship while maintaining its head office within the Principality. In return, ASM agreed
to pay the LFP a single contribution of €50 million.9
On the other hand, this distortion turns out to be an opportunity for the league to
attract more talent since           has the sign of                              It allows limiting the 
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exodus of talent implied by the introduction of a tax.
It must also be noted that the degree of imbalance should increase when distortion
is combined with an asymmetry of resources. Paris and Monaco together account for
43% of the aggregate income excluding trading of L1 for the 2013–2014 season
(DNCG, 2014). This asymmetry calls into question the premise of strict budgetary
constraints.
Soft Budget Constraint, ‘Sugar Daddies,’ and Competitive Imbalance
Private owners do not always seek to achieve a break-even position and can “behave as
non-profit-seeking investors, patrons, or tycoons” (Andreff, 2007, p. 6). The concept of
soft budget constraints (SBC) pioneered by Kornai (1980) to study socialist economies
provides another rational explanation of recurring deficits in the soccer industry. The
concept is best understood when contrasted with its counterpart (Storm & Nielsen,
2012). The hard budget constraint, the dominating form of budget constraint in cap-
italist economies, could be defined as a situation in which “proceeds from sales and
costs of input are a question of life and death for the firm” (Kornai, 1980, p. 303). 
The SBC syndrome can appear in the context of professional soccer.10 Soccer teams
may benefit from local governments (subsidy, rent facilities at subsidized prices, etc.)
or shareholders bail them out. Teams can also influence the tax rules: the Salva Calcio
in 2002 (Hamil, Morrow, Idle, Rossi, & Faccendini, 2010), the agreement between
Lazio and the Italian government in 2005 (Morrow, 2006), the debt reduction in 1985
and 1992 for Spanish clubs (Barajas & Rodriguez, 2010), or the implementation of a
tax cap at 5% of the total revenue. Thus, European professional soccer clubs “operate
chronically on the edge of financial collapse” without going out of business (Storm &
Nielsen, 2012, p. 183). 
However, the limited SBC syndrome is too common a situation to be applied to the
particular cases of PSG and ASM. Both clubs have much looser budget constraints
than their opponents, which enables them to over-invest in players. We assume that
PSG and ASM are not oriented toward win-maximization under strict seasonal budg-
et constraints or limited SBC, but under inelastic SBC. They both want to build com-
petitive teams at the European level in order to perform well in the UEFA Champions
League. For this purpose, “sugar daddies” will invest in recruiting as many top players
as possible, even if this leads to significant budgetary deficits. Then, team 1 owned by
a sugar daddy will invest up to a certain limit to achieve an exogenous stock of talent,
noted as T whatever the cost is. This stock enables the owner to reach its European
sporting goals. The budgetary constraint of the sugar daddy is now endogenous: 
. The reaction function of the sugar daddy, whatever the tax regime, is: 
(5E)
By contrast, team 2 is not allowed to generate a deficit.11 As the sugar daddy invest-
ment ensures a sufficient degree of aggregate quality of teams, we assume σ=0 to focus
on relative talent. Equalizing (5A) and (5E) provide the initial equilibrium G:
(6G)
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Equilibrium H assesses the tax only regime, which allows testing the relevance of the
decision to add a cap to the tax system: the threshold dti ≤(1-x)Pi in (3B) is removed.
By equalizing the reaction functions (5B) and (5E):
(6H)
Equalizing (5C) and (5E) provides the tax plus cap regime equilibrium I:
(6I)
Competitive balance and exodus of talent worsen with the new taxation in the tax
only and the tax plus cap regimes compared to the initial equilibrium:                  and  
as it takes the opposite sign of          , with                     when d=0, then
and                                               takes the sign of             with  
when x=1, then                                                  And when comparing (6H)
and (6I),                                                 whatever                        The implementation
of the cap allows limiting the exodus of talent and the harm of the competitive balance
implied by the introduction of a tax. 
The competitive balance also worsens when gap between owners’ behavior (T)
increases:                             takes the sign of         , therefore increasing the sugar daddy
investment or slackening the cap; both lead to an influx of talent in the league.
Imposing the new tax system implies that the uncertainty of outcome will worsen,
already threatened by the sugar daddy behavior.
With the social and fiscal distortions, and the sugar daddy behavior assumptions,
the conclusions of the previous section are reversed. In Figure 1 and Table 3, we show
that the initial situation was the optimal situation. The only tax regime provides the
most imbalanced league with the less aggregate team quality. According to these new
hypotheses, the decision to add a cap to the tax increases the uncertainty of outcome.
As the cap also slows down the exodus of talent, its introduction seems wise.
From those three models, the 75% tax rate reinforces the polarization of the L1
between two dominant clubs funded by sugar daddies on the one hand, and the other
clubs struggling to remain solvent. The general model indicates that the 75% tax rate
reduces the effect of the revenue advantage of the big clubs in return of an exodus of
talent. Capping the tax levy somewhat reduces those effects. However, if we relax two
basic hypotheses to obtain more realistic forecasts, two clubs enhance their hegemon-
ic positions in the league. Therefore we recommend income redistribution between
teams.
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For Revenue Sharing
Competitive balance can be seen as a public good (Daly & Moore, 1981). Even if all the
members of the league benefit from a well-balanced competition, every club behaves
as a free-rider. Therefore an external regulation is necessary to guarantee an optimal
solution, and the combination of several regulatory tools is effective (Dietl, Lang, &
Rathke, 2011).
The primary objective of the 75% tax rate is to bring down the public deficit and to
act as a symbol of solidarity. We assume that the total amount of tax revenue collect-
ed in tax plus cap regime is deemed sufficient by the French government. Based on this
basic premise, could the new taxation system help improve the attractiveness of L1?
As mentioned previously, Frédéric Thiriez has argued that the system was unfair.
The tax cost reduction associated with the implementation of the cap mostly benefits
Table 4. Effect of the French 75% Tax Rate in L1 with Revenue Sharing (in K€)
Clubs Initial Tax plus cap Only tax regime Only tax regime 
situation regime with revenue sharing
Payroll 75% Residual 75% Residual Revenue Residual 
tax rate payroll tax rate payroll sharing payroll
capped without
cap
Paris 239773 19645 220128 43565 196208 2323 198531
Monaco 94581 0 94581 0 94581 0 94581
Marseille 85112 5227 79885 13034 72078 2323 74401
Lyon 82354 4954 77400 11545 70809 2323 73132
Lille 62190 4813 57377 7696 54494 2323 56817
Montpellier 33434 356 33078 356 33078 2323 35401
Bordeaux 55961 3388 52573 4151 51810 2323 54133
Saint-Etienne 40603 896 39707 896 39707 2323 42030
Rennes 41172 2102 39070 3316 37856 2323 40179
Toulouse 29735 1196 28539 1196 28539 2323 30862
Lorient 25898 0 25898 0 25898 2323 28221
Nice 25394 1076 24318 1076 24318 2323 26641
Evian 17901 0 17901 0 17901 2323 20224
Nantes 18706 0 18706 0 18706 2323 21029
Sochaux 21226 0 21226 0 21226 2323 23549
Valenciennes 20275 206 20069 206 20069 2323 22392
Reims 19004 0 19004 0 19004 2323 21327
Bastia 20581 178 20403 178 20403 2323 22726
Guingamp 18609 9 18600 9 18600 2323 20923
Ajaccio 14405 99 14306 99 14306 2323 16629
Standard- 50124 46033 41021 40881
Deviation
Variation 5.18% 4.99% 4.66% 4.43%
coefficient 
Skewness 2.99 2.92 2.79 2.81
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PSG; 55% of the total savings profit the richest club, which alone represents 31.7% of
the aggregate income excluding trading of L1 for the 2013–2014 season. Though the
cap was implemented to reduce the budgetary pressure on French clubs, it appears to
have a “dead-weight effect for sugar daddy.” Instead of creating a cap, we recommend
implementing revenue sharing funded by the difference between the total amount of
tax revenue collected in the tax plus cap regime and what would have been collected
in the only tax regime. This revenue sharing should improve the attractiveness of L1
by maintaining competitive balance and be inconsequential in terms of stock of talent
as clubs maximize wins. The revenue sharing must concern all L1 clubs whose head
office is located in France. In other words, ASM will not benefit from this measure. In
order to ensure that this tax exemption is neutral with regard to the public budget, the
total amount of the revenue shared must be equal to the amount of additional tax col-
lected thanks to the removal of the cap on the 75% tax rate (x=1 and d>0). In order to
take into account the rent-seeking game played by clubs, this amount will have to be
determined once the 75% tax has been collected. The impact of this policy tool with a
static payroll is given in Table 4.
We use the coefficient of variation to proxy competitive balance (Daly & Moore,
1981). In fine, the variation coefficient between payrolls decreases from 5.18% to
4.43%. The competitive balance is significantly improved at each step of the regula-
tion. Like the implementation of the revenue sharing, the introduction of the 75% tax
rate helps optimize outcome uncertainty, but the most important improvement stems
from removing the 5% cap on the 75% tax. Using the third statistical moment allows
highlighting the polarization of the league. The positive skewness of the payroll distri-
bution points out that the competitive balance is worsened due to a few extremely
good teams (Lee, Jang, & Hwang, 2014). As the skewness decreases with the policy tool
(from 2.99 to 2.81), the only tax regime with revenue sharing holds back the polariza-
tion of L1. The primary aim of the revenue sharing would be to convince the clubs’
union, UCPF, to accept the removal of the cap in return for this new tax rebate. Those
regulation tools help optimize the attractiveness of L1.
Discussion, Implications, and Avenues
Discussion
As European soccer teams are involved in a competitive environment, talent supply is
variable. The welfare of players is not impacted by a change in tax rates as net salary is
assumed to be maintained at the same level (c is constant). If French soccer teams are
no more able to offer a certain level of salary, players will leave the country to keep the
same level of net salary. Regarding club owners, they are assumed to be oriented
toward win maximization. The new tax rate has no effect at an aggregated level, as the
sum of winning percentages must equal 1. Only the sugar daddy utility may decrease
as the introduction of a new tax raises his endogenous SBC. As the new tax rate has no
effect on players and clubs (at the league level), social welfare only varies according to
fan utility, which is assumed to depend on their preference for outcome uncertainty
and the aggregate quality of teams.
The fan preference for competitive balance could be challenged. Borland and
MacDonald (2003) list 15 studies dealing with the correlation between competitive
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balance and attendance. Only seven among them conclude that competitive balance
has, indeed, a positive effect. Yet, if we question the concavity of the revenue function,
the general model yields different results (Cavagnac & Gouguet, 2008). Competitive
balance appears to be only one of the determinants of a team’s revenue function.
According to the Yankee/Manchester United paradox (Szymanski, 2001), an unbal-
anced league could be attractive if teams with the larger fan bases were better than the
others. Do those considerations call into question the validity of the results regarding
the relevance of the 75% tax rate mechanism?
According to Dietl, Lang, and Werner (2009), a degree of imbalance is necessary to
maximize the welfare of sports leagues. Yet, which teams will be the main beneficiar-
ies of the 75% tax rate? The answer is ASM and to a lesser extent PSG. The Principality
team does not have the most devoted fan base and has the worst attendance in L1.12 If
PSG is popular, other clubs with large fan bases (e.g., Marseille, Saint-Etienne, Lyon)
appear to be the main losers of the new taxation.
Moreover, sugar daddy behavior can be perceived as “financial doping” and harms
leagues’ attractiveness. “Many fans complain that it is unfair that wealthy owners are
able to ‘buy’ a championship simply by using their financial muscle” (Peeters &
Szymanski, 2014, p. 355).
The behavioral asymmetry and the social and fiscal distortions as well as the 75%
tax rate widen the gap between PSG and ASM on the one hand and the other clubs on
the other. Two teams will be in contention for the title and the other 18 teams will take
part in another championship in the league. This “leftward shift of the Diracized sub-
set,” since it moves the block of competitively balanced teams toward the bottom, is
non-optimal for the attractiveness of the league (Gayant & Le Pape, 2013). This
explains why the 75% tax rate causes a non-optimal level of imbalance, and revenue
sharing seems necessary.
Another argument challenges this analysis: beyond the dilemma between competi-
tive balance and aggregate quality of teams, competition organizers should help the
emergence of domestic elite perform well in European competitions. The stakes are
twofold. First, country coefficient rankings are based on the results of each domestic
club in the five previous UEFA Champions League and UEFA Europa League seasons.
The rankings determine the number of places allotted to a country in forthcoming
competitions. Second, the revenue function also depends on a club’s performance in
the UEFA club championship. Qualifying for European Cup competitions generates
prize money estimated to amount to an average of 11% of revenue (UEFA, 2011). On
the one hand, LFP wants to maintain competitive balance to increase the attractiveness
of L1. On the other hand, the French league needs teams to perform well in European
competitions. Thus, French broadcasting rights are shared unequally, in favor of the
biggest clubs. LFP should clarify its position. The broadcasting rights sharing suggests
that the league wishes to promote the emergence of an elite team. However, Frédéric
Thiriez’s statement leads us to believe the opposite.
Implications
Contrary to the dominant view, the main threat associated with the 75% tax rate, for
the French soccer championship, is not the risk of bankruptcy. It certainly implies a
new constraint. However, despite earning high revenues, European soccer clubs expe-
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rience financial problems. If enormous revenues are not enough (Solberg & Haugen,
2010), then the nature of the problem must be structural. Several explanations can be
advanced. Andreff (2007) blames the problem on a lack of governance, Solberg and
Haugen (2010) use a game-theory model in the race for talent, and Szymanski (2012)
explains it by negative shocks (productivity and/or demand). 
So where does the trouble come from? According to our study, which takes into
account situations that are specific to L1 (social and fiscal distortions, and behavior
asymmetry), a 75% tax rate harms competitive balance, leads to an exodus of talent,
and reinforces L1 polarization. LFP has failed to improve the competitive position of
French clubs in the UEFA ranking (sixth, after the Portugal championship).
Nevertheless, thanks to the two sugar daddies in L1, the performance of French soccer
clubs in European competitions should improve. Moreover, we have explained that the
actual degree of imbalance is not optimal. That is why LFP should no longer promote
the emergence of an elite, as by doing so, they risk polarizing L1. Nöel Le Graët, chair-
man of the FFF, underlines this when he stated, “Clubs can see that PSG and Monaco
hold the first two places in the championship. Stadiums are being built all over France,
but that’s to play for the third place, at best. This is cause for concern and question-
ing.”13 The revenue sharing (and the regularization of the ASM head office location)
should help maintain competitive balance.
At present, only the top two teams in L1 are ensured qualification for the lucrative
Champions League. This implies that the actual heterogeneity of resources could wors-
en competitive balance through a cumulative effect.14 Apart from this “snowball effect,”
the UEFA Financial Fair Play regulations (FFP) will also ossify the actual hierarchy
(Franck, 2014; Sass, 2016). The clubs’ payroll will have to be entirely financed by rev-
enues generated by soccer, and injections of “external” money will be forbidden. FFP
will act as a barrier to entry and it will become increasingly difficult for a challenger to
fill the gap between the best clubs and itself. Even if the 75% tax rate is a temporary
measure (by assuming no hysteresis effect), its impact could be sustainable. L1 could be
durably polarized and the attractiveness of the French championship diminished.
Avenues
The literature in the economics of sports generally deals with the measure of compet-
itive balance. The non-cooperative model fits well with the theoretical debate. It helps
understand the impact of fiscal measures in terms of outcome uncertainty and exodus
of talent. However, this model does not take into account specific situations such as fis-
cal and social distortions or sugar daddy behavior. It therefore seems necessary to use
it gingerly because results are hypothesis dependent. An interesting avenue for further
research in this area is to challenge the basic premises about a club’s revenue function
or the behavior of their owners (Cavagnac & Gouguet, 2008). Despite the fact that the
general model includes the effect of aggregate talent to the revenue function, the rev-
enue function could also include a trading variable. A club located in a less favorable
area may benefit from player transfer fees paid by a richer club. If the new taxation
damages the recruitment opportunities of the clubs operating in the bigger markets,
this will have negative spillovers on the other club. The impact on competitive balance
would then be reduced to some extent and the exodus of the best players would be
reinforced.
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Moreover, this model does not specify the clubs’ adjustment mechanism. We assume
the talent supply variable (price) is exogenous. Then the available talent stock T is the
adjustment variable. But no more information is given about it. Is it a qualitative
(more or less skilled players) or quantitative (size of the squad) adjustment? Kleven et
al. (2013) point out that the number of players is not correlated to taxation. This
absence of correlation implies a qualitative adjustment, which could impact the attrac-
tiveness of L1. This raises another question: Are the best or the weakest players depart-
ing from the league (and are substituted by lower-ability players)? Even if the players
are the decision-makers for Kleven et al., their results help anticipate the adjustment;
the tax rate is negatively correlated to the presence of the best players, but positively to
the low-ability players.
If the 75% tax rate leads to an exodus of the superstars, fan interest could decrease
exponentially. Indeed, the team attendance and revenue functions of a team could be
correlated to the presence of a superstar on the team (Hausman & Leonard, 1997). The
net-salary differences with the rival leagues are the main determinant of the exodus of
the best French players. The new taxation strengthens those differences while the
Premier League’s TV deal for 2016–2019 already threatens the attractiveness of the L1
and could raise the marginal cost of talent, which is assumed to be constant in the gen-
eral model.
The question of the utility function of sugar daddies could be challenged; is the new
taxation system disincentive enough for them to give up their investments? The eval-
uation of the new tax system could also be improved by a three-club model and a
clearer definition of the league’s priority objective. Much still has to be done about the
socially desirable level of imbalance and the specification of the model to come closer
to reality.
References
Andreff, W. (2007). French football: A financial crisis rooted in weak governance. Journal of
Sports Economics, 8, 652–661.
Andreff, W. (2009). Equilibre compétitif et contrainte budgétaire dans une ligue de sport pro-
fessionnel. Revue Economique, 60, 591–633.
Barajas, Á., & Rodríguez, P. (2010). Spanish football clubs’ finances: Crisis and player salaries.
International Journal of Sport Finance, 5, 52–66.
Borland, J., & MacDonald, R. (2003). Demand for sport. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19,
478–502.
Cavagnac, M., & Gouguet, J.-J. (2008). Droits de retransmission, équilibre compétitif et profits
des clubs. Revue d’Economie Politique, 118, 229–253.
Daly, G., & Moore, W. J. (1981). Externalities, property rights and the allocation of resources in
Major League Baseball. Economic Inquiry, 19, 77–95.
Davenport, D. (1969), Collusive competition in Major League Baseball: Its theory and institu-
tional development, American Economist, 13, 6–30.
Dietl, H. M., Lang, M., & Rathke, A. (2011). The combined effect of salary restrictions and rev-
enue sharing in sports leagues. Economic Inquiry, 49, 447–463.
Dietl, H. M., Lang, M., & Werner, S. (2009). Social welfare in sports leagues with profit-maxi-
mizing and/or win-maximizing clubs. Southern Economic Journal, 76, 375–396.
DNCG. (2014). Rapport annuel de la saison 2013–2014, Commission de contrôle des clubs pro-
fessionnels, Rapport d’activite, Compte des clubs professionnels.
200 Volume 11 • Number 3 • 2016 • IJSF
French 75% Tax Rate
El-Hodiri, M., & Quirk, J. (1971). An economic model of a professional sports league. The
Journal of Political Economy, 79, 1302–1319.
Franck, E. (2014). Financial fair play in European club football: What is it about? International
Journal of Sport Finance, 9, 193–217.
Frick, B. (2007). The football players’ labor market: Empirical evidence from the major
European leagues. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 54, 422–446.
Gayant, J.-P., & Le Pape, N. (2013) Measuring competitive imbalance in team sports: Toward an
axiomatic approach. Working paper.
Gouguet, J.-J., & Primault, D. (2003). Formation des joueurs professionnels et équilibre com-
pétitif : L’exemple du football. Revue Juridique et Economique du Sport, 68, 7–34.
Gouguet, J.-J. (2004). Le sport professionnel après l’arrêt Bosman: Une analyse économique inter-
nationale. [Actes du colloque organisé les 1er et 2 juillet 1999 à Limoges par le centre de droit et
d’économie du sport, CDES]. Limoges, France: Presses Univ. Limoges.
Helleu, B., & Durand, C. (2006). Sport collectif et compétitions internationales entre clubs: Le
cas des équipes canadiennes en Amérique du Nord. Revue Européenne de Management du
Sport, 15, 11–29.
Hamil, S., Morrow, S., Idle, C., Rossi, G., & Faccendini, S. (2010). The governance and regula-
tion of Italian football. Soccer & Society, 11, 373–413.
Hausman, J. A., & Leonard, G. K. (1997). Superstars in the National Basketball Association:
Economic value and policy. Journal of Labor Economics, 15, 586–624.
Késenne, S. (2000). Revenue sharing and competitive balance in professional team sports.
Journal of Sports Economics, 1, 56–65.
Késenne, S. (2007). The economic theory of professional team sports: An analytical treatment.
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Kleven, H., Landais, C., & Saez, E. (2013). Taxation and international migration of superstars:
Evidence from the European football market. American Economic Review, 103, 1892–1924.
Kornai, J. (1980). Economics of shortage: Volumes A and B. Amsertdam, The Netherlands: North
Holland.
Lee, Y. H., Jang, H., & Hwang, S. H. (2014). Market competition and threshold efficiency in the
sports industry. Journal of Sports Economics, 16, 853–870.
Madden, P. (2011). Game theoretic analysis of basic team sports leagues. Journal of Sports
Economics, 12, 407–431.
Madden, P. (2015). ‘‘Walrasian fixed supply conjecture’’ versus ‘‘contest-Nash’’ solutions to
sports league models: Game over? Journal of Sports Economics, 16, 540–551.
Mourão, P. R., & Cima, C. (2015). Studying the golden generations’ effects and the changes in
the competitive balance of the Portuguese soccer league. International Journal of Sport
Finance, 10, 42–61.
Morrow, S. (2006). Impression management in football club financial reporting. International
Journal of Sport Finance,v1, 96–108.
Neale, W. C. (1964). The peculiar economics of professional sports. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 78, 1–14.
Pawlowski, T., Breuer, C., & Hovemann, A. (2010). Top clubs’ performance and the competitive
situation in European domestic football competitions. Journal of Sports Economics, 11,
186–202.
Peeters, T., & Szymanski, S. (2014). Financial fair play in European football. Economic Policy, 29,
343–390. 
Quirk, J. P. (1997). Pay dirt: The business of professional team sports. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Rottenberg, S. (1956). The baseball players’ labor market. The Journal of Political Economy, 64,
242–258.
Volume 11 • Number 3 • 2016 • IJSF 201
Terrien, Scelles, Durand
Sass, M. (2016). Glory hunters, sugar daddies, and long-term competitive balance under UEFA
financial fair play. Journal of Sports Economics, 17, 148–158. 
Scelles, N., Durand, C., Bonnal, L., Goyeau, D., & Andreff, W. (2013). My team is in contention?
Nice, I go to the stadium! Competitive intensity in the French football Ligue 1. Economics
Bulletin, 33, 2365–2378.
Scully, G. W. (1995). The market structure of sports. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Sloane, P. J. (1971). The economics of professional football: The football club as a utility max-
imiser. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 18, 121–146.
Solberg, H. A., & Haugen, K. K. (2010). European club football: Why enormous revenues are not
enough? Sport in Society, 13, 329–343.
Solberg, H. A., & Mehus, I. (2014). The challenge of attracting football fans to stadia?
International Journal of Sport Finance, 9, 3–19.
Storm, R. K., & Nielsen, K. (2012). Soft budget constraints in professional football. European
Sport Management Quarterly, 12, 183–201.
Szymanski, S. (2001). Income inequality, competitive balance and the attractiveness of team
sports: Some evidence and a natural experiment from English soccer. The Economic Journal,
111, 69–84.
Szymanski, S. (2012). Insolvency in English professional football: Irrational exuberance or neg-
ative shocks. Working paper No. 1202.
Szymanski, S., & Késenne, S. (2004). Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team
sports. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 52, 165–177.
Szymanski, S., & Kuypers, T. (1999). Winners and losers: The business strategy of football. London,
UK: Viking Press.
Terrien, M., Durand, C., Maltese, L., & Veran, L. (2014). Taxe à 75%: Un salary cap en ligue 1?
Jurisport: Revue Juridique et Economique du Sport, 42–45.
Terrien, M., Scelles, N., & Durand, C (2015). L’ouverture de la Ligue Nationale de Rugby: le
French flair d’une instance récente. In P. Chaix (Dir.), Le nouveau visage du rugby profession-
nel français (pp. 55–74). Paris, France: L’Harmattan.
Terviö, M. (2006). Transfer fee regulations and player development. Journal of the European
Economic Association, 4, 957–987.
UEFA. (2011). The European club licensing benchmarking report: Financial year 2011. Retreived
from http://www.uefa.org/MultimediaFiles/Download/Tech/uefaorg/General/01/91/61/
84/1916184_DOWNLOAD.pdf
Vrooman, J. (1995). A general theory of professional sports leagues. Southern Economic Journal,
61, 971–990.
Vrooman, J. (2009). Theory of the perfect game: Competitive balance in monopoly sports
leagues. Review of Industrial Organization, 34, 5–44.
Winfree, J. A. (2015). This game is being played under protest. International Journal of Sport
Finance, 10, 88–100.
Winfree, J., & Fort, R. (2012). Nash conjectures and talent supply in sports league modeling: A
comment on current modeling disagreements. Journal of Sports Economics, 13, 306–313.
Endnotes
1 The highest British income tax rate is currently 45%. It could explain why the Premier League
is still able to recruit the best players in the world. 
2 Aggregate net income is negative in L1 since 2007–2008 (DNCG, 2014).
3 See http://www.franceinfo.fr/sports/football/article/pourquoi-les-clubs-de-foot-protestent-ils-
contre-la-taxe-75-293245. To prove how this new tax rate may threaten the viability of the
French championship, clubs made public the data, thanks to the media.
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French 75% Tax Rate
4 Nash equilibrium could also be applied to closed leagues. For further discussion on this topic,
see Madden (2011, 2015), Winfree and Fort (2012), and Winfree (2015).
5 A strictly concave revenue function implies a quadratic function of wins percentage and to
limit β between 1 and 2 because:
(Sass, 2016).
6 This hypothesis seems coherent with the L1 stylized facts as a significant linear correlation
appears between payroll and the amount of tax payable (in only tax regime) by the clubs sub-
ject to 75% tax rate (R2 = 0.92). From the 14 clubs suffering from the new tax system, we exclud-
ed PSG from the sample, considering it as an outlier for its very high payroll.
7 See http://www.slate.fr/story/78358/plafonnement-taxe-75-bouclier-fiscal-psg-grands-clubs
8 See http://www.lemonde.fr/sport/article/2013/09/30/regis-juanico-l-as-monaco-a-un-enorme
-avantage-fiscal_3486973_3242.html. Data is from a governmental source. To put this amount
in perspective, note that it represents the sixth budget of L1.
9 See http://uk.eurosport.yahoo.com/news/football-monaco-pay-league-68-million-keep-tax-
180646621—sow.html. Seven clubs have contested this agreement in the courts, leading to the
cancellation of this “illegal” agreement by the French State Council. Since the court decision, no
new measures were taken about the ASM head office location.
10 Limited SBC means an exogenous tolerance for deficit. We assume that owner step as rescuers
by paying the open bills to keep π=0. Adding the SBC in the revenue functions does not alter the
equilibria defined above, if we assume owners of team 1 and 2 have the same loss tolerance. It
only implies more aggregate talent as SBC increases, but the transitivity of                             and                                                          
are respected.
11 As explained previously, assuming a limited SBC does not alter the results.
12 At the end of the 2013–2014 season; see http://www.lfp.fr/ligue1/affluences/journee
13 See http://www.lequipe.fr/Football/Actualites/Le-graet-un-accord-un-peu-leger/441057
14 See Sass (2016) for a dynamic equilibrium of the general model. Pawlowski, Breuer, and
Hovemann, (2010) also highlight a significant worsening in competitive balance after the mod-
ification of the Champions League payout.
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